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Abstract: China's economic growth heavily relies on fixed asset investment. Previous studies 
have demonstrated that GDP growth plays a key role in assessing Chinese local officials' 
performance and enhancing their chances of political promotion. Thus, local officials have a 
strong motivation to boost the economy, which also impacts the property market. Based on 
this notion, the empirical results of this study indicate that public expenditure fluctuations and 
residential property price movements in Shanghai were positively co-integrated from 1992 to 
2009, suggesting that increased public expenditure has reshaped Shanghai's property cycle 
to have longer booms and shorter busts. The findings also shed light on the nature of property 
cycles in other large- and medium-sized Chinese cities and developing countries with 
rampant economic growth, low real interest rates and an increasing urban population. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Is Shanghai building a giant speculative property bubble? Fifteen years ago, 
approximately 40% of the residential and official buildings in Shanghai were 
vacant (Jackson, 1997). The factors driving the property boom included abundant 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and officials' benefits from selling construction rights 
(Haila, 1999). Five years ago, Shanghai had a bubble that accounted for 22% of 
the property price (Hui and Shen, 2006). More recently, Shanghai had a residential 
property price overvaluation exceeding 30% of its equilibrium price, with an 
estimated vacancy rate of 50% (Ahuja et al., 2010). However, regardless of the 
warning signals, the "bubble" did not burst. Thus, the term "bubble" is cautiously 
used in official documents because a prolonged property boom cannot be 
referred to as a bubble unless it busts.  
While it is difficult to gauge the existence of a bubble, previous studies have 
thoroughly documented macroeconomic variables as determinants of a property 
cycle, such as income (Dokko et al., 1999; Tse and Raftery, 1999; Bjorklund and 
Soderberg, 1999; Jud and Winkler, 2002; Andrew and Meen, 2003; Gallin, 2006), 
inflation (Titman, 1982; Gatzlaff, 1994; Anari and Kolari, 2002), bank lending (Davis 
and Zhu, 2004; Gerlach and Peng, 2005), and stock prices (Sagalyn, 1990; Wilson 
and Okunev, 1999; Brown and Liow, 2001). Housing-specific factors have also been 
discussed, such as the vacancy rate (Wheaton, 1990; Gordon, Mosbaugh and 
Canter, 1996; Barras, 2005) and construction lags (Grenadier, 1995; Mueller, 1995; 
Coleman and Gentile, 2001; Spiegel, 2001; Barras, 2005).  
Although these studies provide some insights into China's property cycle, the 
cycle's mechanisms are still not fully understood because China's housing market is 
frequently affected by the government (Han and Wang, 2003; Zhang, 2006; Li, 
Chiang and Choy, 2011). This paper thus takes into account another perspective 
to broaden the discussion and deepen the understanding of the cycle literature, 
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using Shanghai as a case study. The research hypothesis is that the imperative of 
local officials to boost economic growth ultimately affects the property cycle 
through fixed asset investment in public facilities.  
There are three advantages to using Shanghai as the target city for the 
cycle studies. First, Shanghai enjoys a higher economic autonomy than other cities 
due to its uniqueness and importance in China. Second, a nascent property 
market was established in Shanghai in the late 1980s, thus offering a longer time 
span for analysis compared to other cities. Third, Shanghai's property sector 
experienced a dramatic boom in the early 1990s and was quickly cooled down by 
the tightening of bank loans in the mid-1990s (Haila, 1999). Since the late 1990s, the 
property sector has prospered. The study period is from 1991–2009, during which 
Shanghai has maintained rampant economic growth, low real interest rates and 
an increasing urban population.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: it begins with the 
research hypothesis on the interaction between public expenditures and the 
property cycle. Next, the methodology is explained, and the data are described. 
The empirical results are then presented, and the policy implications are discussed. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn.  
 
 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
 
The research hypothesis is based on the notion that Chinese local officials feel the 
need to ensure fast economic growth because it is the primary indicator by which 
their performance is evaluated and thus determines whether they are promoted in 
the political system (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Li and Zhou, 2005). In the urban 
development context, local officials are inclined to increase the investment in 
public facilities to promote economic growth, which is their winning strategy for 
regional competition to attract foreign or cross-sector investment (Tao et al., 2010). 
Continuously increased public expenditure positively impacts the residential 
property market, thus inducing a prolonged property boom with only minor 
adjustments in residential property price. Figure 1 plots the co-movements of 
public expenditure and residential property price in Shanghai. 
To further explore the interaction between public expenditures and the 
property cycle, three pre-conditions concerning the nature of the Chinese 
property market should be noted. First, the property sector has become a pillar 
industry and a driver of economic growth (Peng et al., 2008; Chen and Zhu, 2008). 
Second, increasing fiscal pressure has led to local officials' short-sighted behaviour 
towards boosting economic growth in recent years (Chen, 2004; Tao and Yang, 
2008). Third, most property-related taxes have remained at the local level (Li and 
Yi, 2007), and most land revenue has been kept for local usage (Tian and Ma, 
2009). These facts indicate that local officials are in favour of property booms.  
Although the literature has noted the positive effect of infrastructure 
spending on property price (Voith, 1991; Benjamin and Sirmans, 1996; Yang and 
Gakenheimer, 2007), it is not clear whether decreases in public expenditure would 
negatively impact property price. However, public facility construction likely has 
adverse effects on the housing environment, including noise or pollution, and thus 
undermines the value of housing. So far, the role of public expenditure on the 
property cycle has not been theoretically debated or empirically tested in the 
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existing literature. This paper thus proposes the following Public Expenditure 
Hypothesis to fill in this gap:  
 
Local government's pursuit for higher economic growth leads to 
increased public expenditure, which ultimately results in longer 
property booms and shorter property busts in Shanghai. 
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Figure 1. Residential Property Price and Public Expenditure in Shanghai 
 
Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook (2010), Shanghai Real Estate Yearbook (2010) 
 
This paper intends to test this hypothesis through the following three propositions:  
 
Proposition 1: Public expenditure and property investment are positively 
correlated, indicating that Shanghai's property boom is largely investment driven 
and is thus consistent with China's current economic growth pattern, which relies 
largely on fixed asset investment. 
 
Proposition 2: Property investment and property price are positively correlated, 
indicating that Shanghai has sufficient housing demand to absorb its housing 
supply and thus rendering expansions in both market volumes and prices. 
 
Proposition 3: Public expenditure and property price are positively correlated, 
indicating that when low real interest rates, rampant business growth and the 
deepening urbanisation process contribute to sufficient housing demand, the 
property cycle depends largely on supply side factors such as governments' public 
spending policies. 
 
If public expenditure and property investment are positively correlated and 
property investment and property price are positively correlated, Propositions 1 
and 2, respectively, will be validated. If both of these assumptions are confirmed, 
Proposition 3 will be tested for the interaction between public expenditure and 
property price. 
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
This study adopts the co-integration approach to investigate the interaction 
between public expenditure and property price. If a set of variables is non-
stationary but a linear combination of them is stationary, then these variables are 
said to be co-integrated (Engle and Granger, 1987). Specifically, if X and Y are 
non-stationary variables with integrations of one (meaning that the variables 
become stationary after the first differencing) and they are co-integrated [thus 
being CI (1) series], then there must exist a representation describing the long-run 
equilibrium dynamics. For example, consider an autoregressive distributed lag 
model with lagged items of X (t – 1) and Y (t – 1) [the ADL (1,1) model]. For brevity, 
the co-integration relationship can be expressed as follows: 
 
0 1 1 2 3 1t t t t tY Y X Xα α α α µ− −= + + + +  (1) 
 
where tµ ~i.i.d.(0,σ²). Taking the expected value of the above equation, we have 
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where 1k is the long-run multiplier of tX on tY . 
 
There are two methods for identifying the co-integration relationship: a trace test 
and a maximum eigenvalue test. Both statistics have an asymptotic distribution, 
and their critical values are provided by Johansen and Juselius (1990). To capture 
the short-run dynamics, a number of lags are typically included for variables 
involved in the model selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (Akaike, 1974) 
or the Schwarz Criterion (Schwarz, 1978). The selection of lags is more appropriate 
for lower AIC and SC values. 
Time series datasets are collected from two sources: the residential property 
price index and residential property investment, both of which are available from 
the Shanghai Real Estate Yearbook. Annual data on public expenditure and 
residential land sales are collected from the Shanghai Statistical Yearbook. Public 
expenditure refers to investment in power generation, transportation, post, 
communication, tap water, gas, parks, green areas, environmental sanitation, and 
administration of civil utilities. The datasets cover the period from 1991 to 2009.  
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Before processing the empirical tests, the time series properties of variables 
are confirmed. Both the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (1979) and the Phillips-
Perron test (1988) are run to determine the stationarity of four variables: public 
expenditure (PE), property investment (INV), property price (HP), and land sale 
revenue (LR). The results are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Unit Root Test 
 
Method INV PE HP LR 
Null Hypothesis: Contain a unit root (Level) 
ADF Test 2.00 (0.99) 1.90(0.98) 0.29(0.76) 0.46(0.80) 
PP Test 1.64 (0.97) 3.50(1.00) 0.29(0.76) 0.77(0.87) 
Null Hypothesis: Contain a unit root (1st Difference) 
ADF Test –3.07 (0.00) –1.82(0.07) –3.40(0.00) –7.40(0.00) 
PP Test –3.04 (0.00) –1.73(0.08) –3.41(0.00) –6.36(0.00) 
 
Note: p-value is contained in brackets, following t-statistics for each variable. When p-value is higher than 
0.10, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, indicating the variable is not stationary. Test Equations do not 
include trend or intercept. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Because all of the variables in Table 1 are I(1) series, first-order differencing will be 
applied to obtain the stationary time series for an unrestricted co-integration 
model. The study period for co-integration analysis is 1992 to 2009. 
 
Proposition 1 
 
Table 2 shows the co-integration relationship between public expenditure and 
residential housing investment (1992–2009). The lag period is set at one, based on 
the AIC and SC criteria.  
 
Table 2. Co-Integration Test for PE and INV (1992–2009) 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesised CE(s) Eigenvalue  Trace Statistic  0.05 Critical Value  Prob.** 
None *  0.66 28.77 20.26 0.0026 
At most 1  0.21 5.12  9.16  0.2709 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesised CE(s) Eigenvalue Max-Eigen Statistic 0.05 Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.66  23.65  15.89  0.0025 
At most 1  0.21  5.12  9.16  0.2709 
 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegration at the 0.05 level. Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegration at the 
0.05 level. *Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999)               
p-values. 
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INV = –0.78 + 0.81PE              (4) 
 
Eq. 4 suggests that there is a long-term equilibrium between public expenditure 
and residential housing investment. Three observations emerge from the result.  
First, public expenditure and residential housing investment move together. 
During the study period, residential investment in Shanghai reached its first peak in 
1996. It declined for the next three years and then entered another boom after 
2000. Meanwhile, public expenditure continued to increase until 1998, fell slightly 
between 1999 and 2000, and subsequently increased. Before the first booming 
phase (1993–1996), both residential investment and public expenditure grew 
moderately. While public expenditure increased drastically to 16.80 billion in 1993, 
residential investment followed by reaching 30.65 billion in 1994, indicating that the 
one-year lag effect of public expenditure has not only triggered but also 
magnified the first property boom (1993–1996) in Shanghai. Increased public 
expenditure also mediated the recession. Due to the Asian financial crisis, 
Shanghai's residential investment began to decline in 1997. However, public 
expenditure continued to increase from 16.80 billion in 1993 to 53.14 billion in 1998. 
Thus, Shanghai's property market quickly came to a low point in 1999 and revived 
from 2000 onwards.  
Second, better infrastructure and the subsequent property boom caused 
the urban land market to soar. At the beginning of Shanghai's property boom in 
1993, land sales for property development increased by an astonishing 153.2% 
from 1992. This significant growth rate quickly caught the attention of the central 
government (Huang and Yang, 1996; Haila, 1999). Policy measures to curb land 
transactions were immediate and effective. Land sales by area in Shanghai 
dropped by 62.5% in 1994, and 45.4% in 1995, continuing to decline until 2000. 
However, it was not surprising that land sales faded ahead of property investment. 
The decline in land sales indicated that real estate developers anticipated a 
decrease in market demand; these real estate developers then chose to buy less 
land to safeguard against economic and political uncertainty, while on-going 
projects could not be easily deferred or cancelled.  
Third, the government's regulative policy on the property sector has been 
counteracted by increased public expenditure. After 2004, the central 
government imposed draconian administrative regulations and monetary policies 
to cool down escalating housing prices. The implemented measures included 
raising the interest rate and the bank reserve ratio, increasing taxes, restricting the 
construction period, preventing land hoarding, limiting foreign investment and 
providing more affordable housing. However, the rampant property market 
continued to prosper. A Shanghai housing affordability report shows that 54.1% of 
respondents spend 20%–50% of their monthly income on housing and 31.8% spent 
over 50%, which is much higher than the expected amount of 1/3 by the central 
bank in 20041. This property fever forced the central government to take further 
action, such as restricting second-hand housing transactions and implementing a 
minimum down payment requirement for self-use housing loans. However, 
residential housing prices continued to increase, indicating that regulative policies 
were mediated.  
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Proposition 2 
 
There is a growing body of literature on the interaction between land sales and 
housing prices (Peng and Wheaton, 1994; Hui and Lui, 2002; Wu, 2007). 
Researchers agree that land sales and housing prices are positively correlated in 
the short term and negatively correlated in the long run. The theoretical 
explanation for this relationship is that in the short term, a property boom induces 
land supply, but in the long run, the market adjusts itself due to the increased 
supply and reaches a new equilibrium at a lower price level. To test whether land 
sales also affect housing investment, a co-integration test is carried out between 
land sale revenue in relation to real estate development and residential 
investment in Shanghai. The lag interval is set at one, according to the AIC and SC 
criteria. The test results are shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Co-Integration Test for LR and INV (1992–2009) 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesised CE(s) Eigenvalue  Trace Statistic  0.05 Critical Value  Prob.** 
None *  0.83 32.18 20.26 0.0007 
At most 1  0.23  4.18  9.16  0.3865 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesised CE(s) Eigenvalue Max-Eigen Statistic 0.05 Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.83  28.00  15.89  0.0004 
At most 1  0.23  4.18  9.16  0.3865 
 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegration at the 0.05 level. Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegration at the 
0.05 level. *Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999)             
p-values. 
 
The test results show that land sale revenue in relation to real estate development 
and residential investment are positively co-integrated according to the following 
equation: 
  
INV = – 2.11 + 0.40LR      (5) 
 
Intuitively, if residential investment (supply) increases, housing price (demand) will 
decline. Thus, residential investment and housing price are negatively correlated. 
However, there is still a possibility that real estate developers may choose to hoard 
undeveloped land so they can sell property at higher prices due to limited market 
supply. In that case, residential investment and housing price are positively 
correlated. The former situation is supported by classical theories in a perfectly 
efficient market, while the latter situation is supported by empirical evidence. To 
tests which opinion holds, Table 4 provides the co-integration analysis between 
property investment and property price.  
 
 
 
Yat Hung Chiang et al. 
92/PENERBIT UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA 
Table 4. Co-Integration Test for INV and HP (1992–2009) 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesised CE(s) Eigenvalue  Trace Statistic  0.05 Critical Value  Prob.** 
None *  0.62 27.68 20.26 0.0039 
At most 1  0.30  7.57  9.16  0.0994 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesised CE(s) Eigenvalue Max-Eigen Statistic 0.05 Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.62  20.11  15.89  0.0102 
At most 1  0.30  7.57  9.16  0.0994 
 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegration at the 0.05 level. Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegration at the 
0.05 level. *Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-
values. 
 
The results in Table 4 show that residential investment and housing price are co-
integrated according to the following equation:  
 
HP = 0.80 + 1.07INV              (6) 
 
Eq. 6 indicates that land hoarding induces a positive correlation between property 
investment and property price. This argument is supported by the following 
examples. Document [214] (2008) of the People's Bank of China requires that 
developers who hold land for more than two years no longer obtain any bank 
loans in the future. This regulation is designed to restrict land hoarding, as only 43% 
of the land acquired by 40 major real estate developers in 12 Chinese cities was 
sold between 2003 and 20082. In Shanghai, major real estate developers have 
intentionally increased their land reserve in recent years.3 Among them, 
Hejihuangpu, the Hong Kong giant under Mr Li-Ka Shing, who is the richest person 
in China, has enough land reserve available for a striking 19.5 years of 
development, as estimated based on its sale volume in 2008. China Wanke, the 
largest real estate enterprise in terms of market capitalisation in Mainland China, 
has 2,990 thousand square meters of land reserve, the highest among the 
remaining developers. Most of China Wanke's land was acquired through bidding 
and auctioning between 2007 and 2008 at record high land prices.  
 
Proposition 3 
 
According to the AIC and SC criteria, the relationship between public expenditure 
and housing price is tested at 2 lags (Table 5).  
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Table 5. Co-Integration Test for PE and HP (1992–2009) 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesised CE(s) Eigenvalue  Trace Statistic  0.05 Critical Value  Prob.** 
None *  0.74 36.86 20.26 0.0001 
At most 1  0.34  8.81  9.16  0.0582 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesised CE(s) Eigenvalue Max-Eigen Statistic 0.05 Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.74  28.05  15.89  0.0004 
At most 1  0.34  8.81  9.16  0.0582 
 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegration at the 0.05 level. Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegration at the 
0.05 level. *Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999)            
p-values. 
 
The test results in Table 5 suggest that public expenditure and housing price are 
co-integrated at two lags according to Eq. 7. 
 
HP = –0.46 + 0.67PE              (7) 
 
To demonstrate the relationship shown in Eq. 7, the impact of public expenditure 
on housing price is traced through historical changes that have taken place in 
Shanghai's Eastern District (Pudong). Pudong was just one of the suburban areas of 
Shanghai before the 1990s, at which point Shanghai was well known for its Western 
District (Puxi). However, Pudong has experienced dramatic economic growth 
during the past two decades due to policy deregulation and increased fixed asset 
investment. In accordance with China's "Five-Year Plan",4 the analysis of Pudong's 
case can be classified into the following three stages from the early 1990s 
onwards. 
During the eighth "Five-Year Plan" between 1991 and 1995, infrastructure 
spending in Pudong reached its twin peaks in 1993 and 1994. The most influential 
infrastructure spending projects were part of the so-called "Seven Roads plus Three 
Bridges Plan" (qilusanqiao) in 1993 and the "Five Roads plus One Bridge Plan" 
(wuluyiqiao) in 1994. These transportation projects made Pudong and Puxi more 
connected, led a large number of enterprises to flock into Pudong between 1993 
and 1994, including a good proportion of foreign investors (Pudong New Area 
Statistical Yearbook, 1995). Pudong was especially attractive to enterprises that 
wanted to climb further up the career ladder, and these enterprises induced the 
middle-income population to move from Puxi to Pudong. The larger population, 
increased income and enhanced surrounding all led to the property boom, 
causing the housing prices in Pudong to reach an initial peak in 1996.  
During the 9th "Five-Year Plan" between 1996 and 2000, the most influential 
events that disturbed infrastructure investment in Pudong included the Asian 
financial crisis and the central government's rigid regulation of the property sector. 
The market calmed down for fear that the deflationary pressure and uncertain 
policy changes could be detrimental to what would otherwise be profitable 
investment opportunities. Even the Shanghai government became more 
conservative. Between 1990 and 1995, public expenditure multiplied by 5.8 times, 
whereas in the 9th "Five-Year Plan", public expenditure was only multiplied by 1.19 
times from 1996 to 2000. In addition to this decrease in the rate at which public 
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expenditure increased, housing prices declined between 1997 and 1999. However, 
there were still a number of infrastructure projects in Pudong, including the Pudong 
Airport, Underway Line 2, Century Venue, and Central Park. During this period, the 
most influential event occurred on 1 May 2000, when the Shanghai government 
abolished tunnel tolls from Puxi to Pudong. As expected, this waive quickly ended 
the property lull around 2000. This transportation enhancement immediately 
initiated another property boom in Shanghai that is still on-going.  
During the 10th "Five-Year Plan" between 2001 and 2005, the Shanghai 
government continued the "Infrastructure First" development strategy in the 
Pudong District. The primary goal of this plan was to better manage and protect 
the Suzhou River, which is a major river across Shanghai. The Suzhou River was 
seriously contaminated by over-industrialisation during the early rise of the Pudong 
District. However, in the 10th "Five-Year Plan", their riversides were assigned to 
provide "suitable residence for the increasing population in Shanghai". The first 
stage of the "Suzhou River Renovation" began in 1999, when 7 billion (RMB) was 
invested to dredge the river courses. In 2003, the second stage added an 
additional 4 billion (RMB) to construct riverside landscapes. Frequent resettlements 
were performed to meet the goal. For example, 76% of resettlements in Pudong 
were related to the renovation plan in 2005. During this period, the housing price 
index in Pudong more than doubled from 1039 in 2000 to 2572 in 2005 (Pudong 
New Area Statistical Yearbook, 2006).  
 
Summary of Results 
 
The empirical results of the three propositions amend or respond to previous 
studies. Deng (2003) suggests that public land leasing helps include private firms in 
the local government's alternative revenue sources but does not provide empirical 
evidence. The test result of Proposition 2 supports his conclusion with an empirical 
positive co-integration between land leasing revenue and property investment in 
Shanghai. Because land bidding and auctioning allow more private developers to 
participate in the process, the local government's revenue increases and property 
development is encouraged. The results of Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 support 
the conclusion that infrastructure projects do not only serve as public goods; they 
also induce higher property investment and support local economic growth. This 
result corresponds with those of other studies (Demurger, 2001; Ding, 2003; 
Lichtenberg and Ding, 2008).  
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
In a transitional economy, the state and the market play simultaneous roles in 
China's economic development and property market development. While 
numerous studies have looked into the market forces impacting China's property 
cycle, this study substantiates previous studies by exploring the impacts of planning 
forces. The results showed that local officials play a decisive role in shaping 
Shanghai's property cycle into a pattern of longer booms and shorter busts by 
increased public expenditure.  
Rampant economic growth, low real interest rates and a deepening 
urbanisation process have been prevalent in most major Chinese cities over the 
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past two decades, apart from Shanghai. While strong economic growth provides 
local government officials higher fiscal revenue to invest in public facilities, low 
financing costs and a growing urban population contribute to the surging housing 
demand. Therefore, the research findings can be applied to other cities in China 
and shed light on the nature of China's seemingly unrelenting property boom in 
recent years. For example, due to the "financial tsunami" triggered by the sub-
prime property mortgage crisis in the US, China faced a great economic 
challenge in 2008. To overcome this difficulty and sustain economic growth, the 
central government announced a RMB 4-trillion (or USD 500-billion) stimulus 
package to increase government spending on 5 November, 2008.5 Approximately 
40% of the expenditure (1.5 trillion) is earmarked for infrastructure spending. In line 
with the central government's policy changes, the Shanghai government also 
authorised an additional investment of RMB 140 billion for transportation from 2009 
to 2012.6 On average, an additional increase of 35 billion (RMB) is anticipated over 
the next four years. Thus, Shanghai's housing price is expected to continue to 
increase in the near future. In fact, increased public expenditure has already had 
positive and long-lasting impacts on property prices in Shanghai and other cities, 
as indicated by the upward housing price indexes of 70 large- and medium-sized 
Chinese cities from 2010 to 2011 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). 
The findings have international implications for other developing countries as 
well. Developing countries such as Brazil and India are simultaneously speeding up 
their public expenditure to support their economic development (World Bank, 
2006; IMF, 2007). Investigating the relationship between public expenditure and 
property price in these developing countries will enhance the understanding of 
their property cycles' mechanisms and provide policy implications for the 
governments when pursuing sustained yet balanced development strategies. For 
example, India is the second largest country in the world by aggregate 
population. Indian house prices have been rising rapidly since 2002 due to strong 
economic growth and quickened urbanisation. However, in Mumbai's city centre, 
a housing bubble was encouraged by inadequate infrastructure, from 2008 to 
2010 in particular7. Thus, a more adequate infrastructure spending plan would 
alleviate the problems of home ownership and housing affordability in India.  
There are certain limitations of this research. The hypothesis and propositions 
are based on the assumptions of rampant economic growth, a low real interest 
rate and a deepening urbanisation process, which have been the cases in 
Shanghai and most other large- or medium-sized Chinese cities during the study 
period. However, these conditions may change in the future, in which case the 
findings would need to be re-examined. In addition, while co-integration is valid 
for investigating the interactions among endogenous variables, changes in 
exogenous variables, such as demographic, financial or economic factors, may 
affect the long-term relationships observed in the current co-integration equations. 
Future research will focus on two areas to address these limitations. First, a longer 
time series analysis will be carried out to determine whether the observed co-
integration relationships remain valid. Second, with data from more cities, the 
panel data model will be used to examine whether the interactions between 
fluctuations in public expenditure and property price are still significant after 
controlling for these economic, demographic and financial fundamentals. 
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NOTES 
 
1. Price-to-income ratio is 12:1 in heated cities of real estate industry, China 
Youth Daily (Zhong guo qing nian bao), 14 August 2006. 
2. National Land Resource Bureau regulates land hoarding, Law and 
Regulation Daily (fazhiribao), 14 September 2009. 
3. Major developers hold land in Shanghai, Morning Oriental 
(dongfangzaobao), 7 May 2009. 
4. China's "Five-Year Plan" refers to the development plan designed in one 
period of official's positions because Chinese officials are reelected every 
five years. Dividing the property cycle and public expenditure interaction by 
the "Five-Year Plan" is most applicable for taking local officials' incentives 
into consideration. 
5. Fiscal and financial policy changes: 4 trillion investment plan to stimulate 
domestic demand, Xinhua News Daily (xinhuaribao), 10 September 2008. 
6. 140 billion investment for transportation, Morning Oriental 
(dongfangzaobao), 13 November 2008. 
7. India housing bubble trouble, Retrieved from: http://www. 
globalpropertyguide.com/Asia/India/Price-History.  
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